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Introduction
Broad Socio-Political Context
Periodisation: Period 1: 1991 to 2001 from Independence to 2001 Ethnic Con-
fl ict; Period 2: 2001 to 2008 post-confl ict pre-NATO; Period 3: 2008-present 
post-veto nationalism;
This paper looks at the general political and security sector context in the last 
two decades since Macedonian independence, and traces the major trends 
and events that shaped the political developments and progress with security 
sector reforms in post-communist Macedonia. For the purpose of this paper, 
the analysis of the post-communist transition period is divided in three parts, 
corresponding to the three periods on which we divided the context since 
1991, for the sake of greater clarity and analytical coherence. For each of these 
three periods, we conducted an analysis of major political developments as 
well as institutional change. Based on this analysis, each period is qualifi ed as 
characterised by a specifi c nature, whether post-authoritarian, confl ict, post-
confl ict, or integrationist. In the Annex attached to this paper, a short overview 
of the key political actors and their role in the security sector reforms and the 
political transition in Macedonia is off ered.
The fi rst period analyzed is the period from the declaration of independence 
from Yugoslavia, in 1991 until the ethnic confl ict in 2001. These years mark the 
fi rst decade of independent statehood and democratic politics in Macedonia. 
This period is particularly important since it sees the establishment of the Mac-
edonian state, army, democratic and legislative institutions, which will shape 
later developments and the trajectory that Macedonia will follow in the years 
to come. The context during this period is predominantly post-authoritarian, 
due to the transition from communist to democratic political regime and the 
dominance of transitional issues on the political agenda. Some pre-confl ict el-
ements emerge during the late 1990s due to the deterioration of inter-ethnic 
relations and frequent ethnic incidents. However, ethnic concerns do not climb 
up on the political agenda until 2001.
The second period stretches from the ethnic confl ict in 2001 until the NATO 
Summit in Bucharest in early 2008. The 2001 confl ict had a profound impact 
on the political and security context in Macedonia. It produced inter-ethnic 
violence and culminated in a far-reaching reform of the constitutional and 
institutional set-up of Macedonian democracy. It therefore marks the begin-
ning of a new period of Macedonian politics, one where dominant issues are 
post-confl ict concerns of reconstruction, disarmament and demobilization of 
armed troops, war crimes, and ethnic issues touching on constitutional, public 
administration and legal reforms. The dominant nature of the political context 
in this period is post-confl ict. However, this period also witnesses the intensi-
fi ed activity towards EU and NATO integration and eff orts to fulfi l the necessary 
requirements in order to join these organizations, so it would be appropriate to 
pint out to the integrationist nature of the political context during this period.
Finally, the last period is the short time after the 2008 Bucharest Summit of 
NATO. In 2008, Macedonia while having fulfi lled the necessary requirements to 
join the Alliance, did not receive an invitation to become a NATO member, due 
to the veto that Greece invoked because of the name dispute. The Bucharest 
summit is an important event in Macedonian politics for two reasons. Firstly, it 
marks the successful eff orts to reform the security sector after the 2001 confl ict 
to an extent suffi  cient to become a member of NATO. This clearly points to a 
successful managing of post-confl ict context challenges and therefore marks 
the end of the previous period of analysis. Secondly, the Bucharest summit is 
important since it did not result with Macedonia becoming a NATO member, 
as was the case with all previous post-communist states. This event indicates 
a diff erent trajectory that Macedonia has taken when compared with other 
states in the region, not having resolved its problems with Greece almost two 
years after the Bucharest Summit. While this is a short period, it is rather distinct 
from the other two, and from what new developments have been analyzed it 
appears that this period is characterized by post-veto nationalism, the label 
which we use for the dominant political context in this period. 
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PERIOD 1: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 
CONFLICT (19912001)
This part of the paper focuses on the general political and security devel-
opments in Macedonia during the fi rst period of analysis between 1991 
and 2001. The initial section deals with the general context during this 
period, paying special attention to two specifi c aspects that characterised 
Macedonian politics in this period: popular support to state-building and 
path-dependency in institution-building. It also presents an overview of 
the security sector and threats to security during this period. The following 
section focuses on institutional and sectoral analysis, outlining the major 
institutional and policy developments in the security sector.    
1.1 General Context
The fi rst period of post-communist politics in Macedonia is marked by two 
major events, which represent critical junctures. The fi rst of these was se-
cession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and dec-
laration of independence by plebiscite in September 1991 – marking the 
beginning of post-communist politics and sovereign statehood for Mac-
edonia. second, the ethnic confl ict between Macedonian armed forces and 
ethnic Albanian armed groups in 2001 which, while brief, had a profound 
impact on the concepts of statehood and democracy in Macedonia as well 
as on the security sector and the wider security context including per-
ception of threats and need for reforms. Since independence, there were 
a number of other junctures where Macedonian decision-makers could 
choose in which direction to steer Macedonian politics before 2001: insti-
tutional choices such as adopting a new Constitution in November 1991, 
changing the electoral laws, foreign policy choices, establishing diplomatic 
relations with international organizations and with neighbouring states, 
name and territorial disputes,  and domestic policy choices such as reform-
ing the public sector, privatisation, economic restructuring, and ethnic mi-
norities policy. Perhaps the ethnic confl ict could have been avoided had 
diff erent decisions been made. With the advantage of hindsight, we can 
take a critical look back at this period and evaluate the impact that it had 
on the following periods and current developments in Macedonian politics 
in general, and in the security sector in particular. 
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Establishing a sovereign state in 1991 was truly a groundbreaking event 
in Macedonian politics and history. Before 1991, Macedonian experience 
with statehood was confi ned within the limits of the Yugoslav federation 
as one of the six constituent federal units, but coming short of actual sov-
ereignty and independence. Therefore, for the political elites, as well as for 
the entire population, establishing a sovereign state was a historical event, 
one matched with an overwhelming enthusiasm as displayed in levels of 
public support on the independence referendum held on September 8, 
1991 when more than 95% of those who voted supported independence.1 
One should note that the independence referendum was boycotted by the 
majority of the ethnic Albanian population in Macedonia, which although 
did not aff ect the outcome of the referendum it did pose some questions 
about the legitimacy of the newly-founded state among the diff erent eth-
nic groups. Albanians were concerned about the status they would have in 
a new Macedonian state, fearing being relegated to a “minority” after dec-
ades of being a constituent nation in SFRY. Consensus among all groups in 
society (ethnic or other) on who the ‘people’ are and what the ‘state’ is, is one 
of the fundamental pre-conditions of establishing democracy according to 
most scholars of democratisation2, so failing to bring on-board all ethnic 
groups at the moment of establishing statehood is a missed opportunity 
for placing Macedonian statehood on a foundation of initial consensus that 
did come to haunt the political elites in the years that followed.  
Two aspects of the new statehood context are especially relevant for the 
present analysis and will be elaborated further: the popular enthusiasm - 
translated into strong support for state-building and related reforms, and 
the lack of statehood history which amounted to little institutional heritage 
to go back to when communism was discredited as offi  cial ideology. 
1.1.1. Popular support to statebuilding
Much alike the other states that emerged out of communism on the eve of 
the 1990s, the Macedonian population entered the period of post-commu-
nist transition to democracy with great expectations. In the Macedonian 
1 Drzavna Izborna Komisija. Rezultati od izborite 1990-2000. Available at: http://www.sec.
mk/Default.aspx?tabid=855  
2  D. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model” in Comparative Politics. 
Vol.2, No.3, (April 1970) and R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1971).
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case, perhaps even greater thanks to the excitement of establishing an in-
dependent state. From the present perspective of apathetic electorate and 
inactive governments, the period of the early 1990s seems to have been a 
window of opportunity for implementing many painful reforms in the pub-
lic sector, from market regulation to security sector reforms. When elections 
turnout soared up to above 70% of the electorate and political parties could 
rally hundreds of thousands of citizens on city squares, a bold political lead-
ership with daring reform programme could have achieved a lot. But the 
opportunity was missed. Looking at this period from a path-dependence 
perspective3, the early 1990s and the fi rst couple of democratic cabinets 
had the rare opportunity to make decisions that would set the trajectory 
for those that would follow. However, Macedonian political leadership of 
the 1990s can hardly be seen as bold and daring. The lukewarm privatisa-
tion eff orts led to failed reconstruction of socialist economy and plunge 
in the living standards of the population4 while the public administration 
remained virtually unchanged from the mammoth structure of communist 
times5. Instead, just like elsewhere in the region, political elites engaged in 
nationalist politics, exploring and re-discovering histories forbidden dur-
ing communism, spending the political capital on symbolic issues, such as 
the name dispute with Greece, while failing to proceed with much-needed 
reforms and establishing closer relations with international organizations 
such as NATO and the EU.6 Such politics did not only amount to many 
missed opportunities for reform and the waste of precious political capital 
and public support, but by the end of the 1990s, the elites were faced with 
a shipwrecked economy, weak democracy, recalcitrant population, and no 
political capital for pursuing further reforms.   
3 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004)
4 Macedonia’s GDP experienced negative growth until 1996, and by the end of the 1990s, 
the Macedonian economy had not reached the pre-1990 growth rates. Gross Domestic 
Product 1990-2000. State Statistical Offi  ce. 2002. (http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/soopsteni-
ja_28.05.2002/SOOP.3.1.2.02.pdf ) 
5 The fi rst Public Administration Reforms Strategy was adopted in 1999. Reformi vo javnata 
administracija. Vlada na Republika Makedonija. (http://rja.gov.mk/fi les/documents1/Strate-
gija_RJA_mk.pdf) 
6 Macedonia established diplomatic relations with the EU only in 1996, after the Preliminary 
Accord between Macedonia and Greece was signed in December 1995 under the auspices 
of the UN. 
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1.1.2. Pathdependency and institution building
Another problematic aspect of the early transition years was the lack of 
both democratic and statehood tradition and experience. The Macedonian 
state and democracy were built from scratch. A very common practice was 
borrowing models from other, mostly West European, states. The Constitu-
tion, the political and electoral systems, as well as many legislative solutions 
were copied from other states (a practice that never lost its appeal, espe-
cially with later Twinning projects of the EU) with little refl ection over their 
applicability and the state’s capacity to implement them. Many of them (the 
Constitution, the electoral system etc.) later proved problematic and need-
ed to be reformed. 
The period after 1991 also marked the fi rst Macedonian steps into demo-
cratic politics. With the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Yu-
goslav federation, the new Macedonian state was founded on democratic 
principles as enshrined in the 1991 Constitution. This translated into multi-
party free elections where citizens could choose to vote for candidates from 
diff erent political parties. Although some political fragmentation was inevi-
table, perhaps due to the majoritarian electoral system that was retained 
from communist times, Macedonia did not experience the splintering and 
fragmentation of political parties as some other post-communist states did. 
The two largest parties on the 1990 elections remained such for the next 
two decades (The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) – which 
succeeded the former Communist Union of Macedonia; and VMRO the 
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE)). Among 
the ethnic Albanian electorate the situation is a bit diff erent, as the politi-
cal parties which dominated the political scene in the 1990s (the Party for 
Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP)) 
have all but disappeared in the post-2001 context while new political par-
ties command the support of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia (Democratic 
Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)). The 
elections, while never outright fraud, also never quite lived up to western 
democratic standards due to sporadic violent incidents, proxy and family 
voting or other irregularities.7 Other elements of democracy were at equally 
poor levels: civil society, while never stigmatized, was also never infl uential 
or accepted by the wider population as a means to controlling the work of 
7  UNDP. “I will vote by myself, thank you” in Gender in Europe and CIS. Available at: http://
europeandcis.undp.org/gender/show/30521F9A-F203-1EE9-B6D7F1FC3C89B37D 
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the government. The media were often under political infl uence, if never di-
rectly controlled, – both of which practises hold until today, which implies a 
worrisome conclusion about the lack of positive trend in the consolidation 
of Macedonian democracy.8    
1.1.3. Security and security threats 
The security sector, apart from the military, did not receive any special at-
tention and was treated as the rest of the public administration, with a few 
superfi cial changes implemented during this period. The military was dif-
ferent since with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army (JNA) from Macedo-
nian territory, Macedonia had no army. Thus, creating an Army was of high-
est priority as it was a matter of establishing full sovereignty and control 
over the territory as well as a necessity in times and place of great instability 
and threats to security. The Army of Republic of Macedonia (ARM) was cre-
ated with personnel from JNA and members of the other security forces 
who joined the ranks of ARM. In the meantime, the president Kiro Gligorov 
invited UN preventive troops to patrol the new Macedonian borders along 
with ARM. UN troops remained in Macedonia until 1999. 
In the internal political arena, the greatest security risk in this period relates 
to the inter-ethnic relations and the balance between the two largest eth-
nic communities in Macedonia: Macedonians and Albanians. The relations 
between the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian population deteriorated 
signifi cantly in the course of the fi rst decade after independence. Despite 
the participation of ethnic Albanian political parties in coalition govern-
ments since 1992, the major demands of the Albanian minority related to 
increased participation in the public administration, offi  cial Albanian lan-
guage use and university education in Albanian, and constitutional recog-
nition of Albanians as ‘constituent people’ or ‘founding people’ in the Mac-
edonian state, have not been heeded. A number of violent incidents during 
the 1990s indicated tensions between the two communities and between 
the ethnic Albanian population and the state institutions in particular. In 
1995 the police violently broke up the celebrations for the establishment 
of Albanian-language Tetovo University in Mala Recica village near Tetovo, 
while in 1997 special police units clashed with the masses demonstrating 
8  Even in 2008, only about 16% of the Macedonian citizens trust civil society institutions and 
media, compared to 38% trust in the Army and 51% in religious organizations. “Balkan Moni-
tor: Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans.” Gallup. 2008. http://www.balkan-mon-
itor.eu/index.php/dashboard/70-of-macedonian-albanians-supported-ohrid-agreement/ 
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in the centres of Tetovo and Gostivar after the Albanian fl ags displayed in 
front of city halls  were forcefully removed by the police. These, and many 
other smaller, incidents reveal that not only were inter-ethnic relations in 
Macedonia poor but also that the state security bodies had no capacity to 
deal with sensitive security situations and act preventively, on the contrary, 
the actions of the police and the special units further aggravated the situ-
ation.
Externally, the greatest security risks for Macedonia came from its neigh-
bourhood. Macedonia’s recent statehood was questioned and challenged 
from many sides: Greece objected to the use of the name Macedonia and 
in return blocked Macedonia’s international recognition under that name 
while also blocking Macedonia’s membership in many international organi-
zations until December 1995 when an Interim Accord was signed between 
Greece and Macedonia, and Macedonia could engage in international af-
fairs under the reference FYROM. Bulgaria challenged the existence of Mac-
edonian nation and Macedonian language, until in 1999 an inter-govern-
mental agreement on the Macedonian and Bulgarian language was signed 
and the issue was dropped from the offi  cial agenda between the two states. 
The international border between Macedonia and Serbia was not marked 
until 2003, not to speak of the porous nature of that border on the strip with 
Kosovo and the failure of the Macedonian institutions to take full control of 
state territory (which triggered the confl ict in 2001 when a journalist crew 
investigating claims of para-military forces taking control over the north-
ernmost village on the border with Kosovo was abducted.) These security 
risks were not of a traditional military nature, but rather they threatened 
the identity and community (perceived as it was in ethnic terms). While few 
expected military clash with Greece and Bulgaria or Serbia/Kosovo, their 
attitudes towards Macedonia were taken seriously and to a great extent 
shaped the foreign (and domestic) policies of Macedonia as the question-
marks they placed over Macedonian statehood and its symbols remained 
even after eff orts were made to overcome them. Even today the unresolved 
name dispute with Greece has serious ramifi cations on Macedonian foreign 
policy and more closely to security sector reforms, as that was the sole rea-
son behind Macedonia’s failed NATO membership application. Insecurity 
fostered mistrust in the neighbours and that undermined regional coop-
eration, while trade embargoes from Greece and to Serbia harmed the Mac-
edonian economy, as did the unresolved international recognition and the 
delays in membership in international organizations.  
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The result of the policies pursued by three government cabinets (of dif-
ferent ideological affi  liation) during the fi rst decade after independence, 
was a young and weak state, freshly out of a communist regime at the very 
start of democratisation, with weak and unconsolidated institutions, a ru-
ined economy and a society polarized and divided on ethnic and political 
grounds. All of these amount to a strong post-communist (close to post-
authoritarian) and ‘pre-confl ict’ socio-political and security context.
1.2. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis
1.2.1. The Army
Quick mapping of the security sector in the initial period after the independ-
ence shows serious gaps and missing elements that required immediate at-
tention. As already stated, just like elsewhere in the former Yugoslav repub-
lics, JNA withdrew and new army needed to be established. Between 1991 
and 1992, when the newly elected president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, 
negotiated with Federal secretary for National Defence of SFRY, Blagoja Ad-
zic, peaceful withdrawal of JNA from Macedonian territory, the remaining 
predominantly Serb and Montenegrin staff ed JNA units were not consid-
ered by other security institutions, or political elites and the population, as 
part of the Macedonian security sector but more like a potential threat to 
the newly established independence and sovereignty of the Macedonian 
state. Moreover, and similar to elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, JNA took lit-
erally everything that could be taken including equipment, weaponry, ma-
teriel, supplies etc., leaving thus very scant infrastructure on which to build 
the new Macedonian army. The establishment of the Macedonian Army 
(ARM) started with the passing of the Law on Defence in February 1992 
and the taking control over the borders and military objects in Macedonia 
which was completed soon, on March 27, 1992 as signed by the agreement 
between President Gligorov and JNA General Nikola Uzelac. The fi rst ARM 
conscripts arrived in the barracks in April 1992 and took control over the 
Macedonian borders from the police.9  
The capacity, human and technical, of the newly established ARM was re-
gretfully small. Even though ARM had offi  cially taken over the control of the 
9 Istorija na ARM. Ministerstvo za Odbrana na RM. Available at: http://www.morm.gov.
mk:8080/morm/mk/ARM/History/History1.html 
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Macedonian borders, in the initial period while the recruits were undergo-
ing basic training, the borders were guarded by professional, contracted, 
soldiers from the reserve units. The UN deployed a preventive mission in 
Macedonia – UNPREDEP, whose forces also assisted ARM in patrolling the 
borders until 1999. It takes a while to build an army from scratch, and so 
was the case with ARM, the building of whose capacity and potential took 
the best part of the 1990s. Most of the offi  cers were actually former JNA 
offi  cers socialized and trained in JNA, so perhaps the freedom to build the 
army on a new concept was not as great. Nevertheless, from the very be-
ginning the objective was to create a modern and effi  cient army that could 
integrate well with collective security mechanisms in the region and wider. 
The results of these eff orts could be seen already by the mid- to late- 1990s, 
when in November 1995 Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
which meant a closer relation to NATO and as well as assistance in security 
and defence reform, and participation in and hosting of regional and inter-
national military exercises which happened in 1996 and 1997 respectively.10 
In this period, the army was a rather young institution and not directly in-
volved in providing security and interacting with the citizens. Therefore, 
ARM was not perceived in negative terms by the population as either cor-
rupt or oppressive, although there are few resources to track the exact 
trend of popular trust in the military. Some scandals concerning ownership 
of army apartments and weapons procurement broke in the media, but in 
comparison to corruption scandals involving the police, political parties 
and government offi  cials, the ARM comes off  as a relatively transparent and 
trusted institution. 
1.2.2. The Police
In the security vacuum of the early years of independence the police was 
the main security actor and provider in Macedonia. Before ARM took over 
the control over the borders in April 1992, the police was responsible for 
controlling them, since declaration of independence in September 1991, in 
addition to performing the regular police duties and providing security to 
citizens. During this time the police was overstretched in fulfi lling all these 
tasks, considering its limited human and technical capacity (the police had 
only 6,000 members at the time). Those early eff orts by the police to protect 
10  Istorija na ARM. Ministerstvo za Odbrana na RM. 
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the borders and provide security for the newly independent Macedonian 
state made the police one of the most important political as well as security 
actors at the time.
The patriotic label that the police earned during the initial post-independ-
ence period did not translate into a general demand for reforms of the po-
lice. Unlike some other post-communist states, Macedonia did not proceed 
to dismantling the communist police apparatus, although there were some 
eff orts at reforming the way the police worked. Until 1995, the work of the 
police was regulated by the old Law on Internal Aff airs, dating back to Yu-
goslav times. Since the mid-1990s, the police have been subject to regu-
lar, if not intensive training in human rights, and rule of law, often funded 
and implemented by international organizations. These trainings were also 
aimed at improving the relations between the police and the growing sec-
tor of international organizations and NGOs in Macedonia. It is disputable 
how eff ective these training and reform eff orts were, considering their 
incidental nature and the lack of follow-up. By the late 1990s, the regular 
Annual Ombudsman Reports confi rmed that violation of human rights by 
the police was widespread, despite the eff orts to train policemen in human 
rights.11 Over this decade, the numbers of the police grew, but recruitment 
was often not transparent and led to a phenomenon of politicization of the 
police, which will come to plague the work of the police and undermine 
reform eff ort in the following years. 
1.2.3. Intelligence Services
The 1995 Law on Internal Aff airs provided for reforms in the intelligence 
sector, which during communist times was operating as part of the police. 
An Intelligence Agency (IA) was established as a separate body from the Di-
rectorate for State Security (UBK), a counter-intelligence body that during 
SFRJ existed as part of the Ministry of Interior. The Intelligence Agency was 
under double authority: of the President and the government, while UBK 
remained outside of presidential authority. This law instituted the basic 
principles of democratic oversight over the work of intelligence services. A 
Parliamentary Committee was named responsible for controlling the work 
of UBK and IA. This committee receives the annual reports of the work of 
intelligence services and, if necessary and the Parliament decides so, re-
11 Godisni izvestai za rabotata na Narodniot pravobranitel. Naroden pravobranitel na Repub-
lika Makedonija. Available at: http://www.ombudsman.mk/default.aspx?cId=104&Lan=MK 
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ports can be discussed at a plenary session. Military intelligence was not 
integrated with the UBK and IA, and no cooperation between them was 
established on the operational level. Sharing information was possible only 
at the highest executive level. As a heritage from communist times, all intel-
ligence institutions were perceived with mistrust by the larger population, 
in addition to which, very few of the reform eff orts were publicized and 
little was done in terms of improving the image of these institutions in the 
eyes of the public. Thus for the better part of the early transition, the intel-
ligence sector in Macedonia is not included in the early reforms along with 
the rest of the security sector. 
At the executive level, the Constitution designates the President as the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, while the management of the 
army and police is a responsibility of the government, in particular the Min-
istries of Defence and Interior. The political system in Macedonia is mixed, 
but the main executive powers are vested in the government, so the main 
policy decisions concerning security are made and implemented though 
governmental institutions – ministries and agencies. The President is the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but his/her infl uence over policy 
is rather limited. In this period, while most of the governmental institutions 
are in place, the government lags in passing strategic security documents 
that would provide guidelines for reforms and policy development in the 
security sector. In the legislative branch, the Parliament is the responsible 
institution passing legislation as well as democratic oversight of the work 
of security actors. The legislative backbone is set with the Law on Defence 
and Law on Internal Aff airs, in addition to which several other laws regu-
lating the security sector were adopted, such as the Law on Borders and 
Border Areas, Law on Protection of Personal Information, and with the 1998 
turnover of political power (from SDSM to VMRO-led government), the Law 
on Procedure for Personal Files led by State Security, with which access to 
these fi les was open to all who expressed a wish to see them.       
The fi rst period of analysis, spanning post-independence and pre confl ict 
years, is marked with post-communist and pre-confl ict features of politics. 
The initial decade witnesses the establishment of basic state institutions 
and democratic practices after the fall of communism. This period also wit-
nesses the establishment of the Macedonian army, as one of the major pil-
lars of the Macedonian security sector, and initial eff orts at transforming 
the rest of the security sector institutions into democratic security actors, 
although overall reform remains very limited.
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PERIOD 2: 2001 – 2008: FROM OHRID
TO BUCAREST 
2.1. General context
The ethnic confl ict between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albani-
an rebels in the six months during spring and summer 2001 was a landmark 
event that opened a window for re-thinking a lot of the ideas on which 
Macedonian statehood and politics was based during the 1990s. By far, this 
was the greatest threat to Macedonian security since independence. Mac-
edonian police, army, special units, intelligence and newly-founded para-
military units both on the Macedonian and the Albanian side all engaged in 
the confl ict - some of them for the fi rst time in combat. The precariousness 
of the ethnic balance was revealed as well as the need for deeper inter-
vention and reforms in the institutional set-up. The inconclusive end of the 
confl ict and the need for external mediation revealed the lack of fi ghting 
and strategic capacity of Macedonian security forces12 as well as the lack 
of capacity of Macedonian institutions to peacefully resolve and mediate 
confl ict. Therefore, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), brokered by the 
EU and US mediators, which was signed on August 13, 2001 by the lead-
ers of the four largest political parties in Macedonia (SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE, 
DPA and PDP), provided for major reforms of the public sector: education, 
decentralization, language use, and the security sector.
2.1.1. The Ohrid Framework Agreement and
            postconflict reforms
It is diffi  cult to claim that there was a large popular demand for these re-
forms, apart from the decade-long demands of the ethnic Albanian popula-
tion for greater inclusion in the public administration. The Ohrid Agreement 
reforms of the public sector were rather externally driven even if some of 
the political elites became aware of the need for reforms. The external in-
volvement in the reform process continued (and perhaps even increased) 
12 ARM units have participated in international peace-keeping missions before, but they 
have never engaged in combat. The equipment and weapons of both ARM and the Macedo-
nian Police were obsolete and a lot of weapons and equipment were purchased and rented 
in the course of the short confl ict. 
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as Macedonia expressed serious aspirations for joining the European Union 
and NATO, so the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement provisions was 
included in the political criteria against which Macedonia’s progress was 
being evaluated. On the one hand this helped the implementation of the 
reforms due to the pull of conditionality,13 but on the other hand the own-
ership of the Ohrid reform process shifted to the EU and domestic elites of-
ten treated it as imposed by the EU not as an organic document agreed by 
domestic political leaders. In 2008, eight years after its signing, only about 
44% of the Macedonian population feels the Ohrid agreement is a good so-
lution for the ethnic problems in Macedonia (although in case of the ethnic 
Albanian population, this percentage is 70%).14  
The Ohrid Agreement instituted the principle of equitable representation in 
the public administration, which means ethnically-sensitive employment 
in public institutions in order to match the percentage of public employees 
from the smaller ethnic communities to their share in the population. This 
should make all public institutions more representative of ethnicity. In the 
security sector more substantial reforms were required, so international or-
ganizations assisted the Macedonian government in implementing police 
and army reforms, with EU, NATO and OSCE leading the eff orts to reform 
the Macedonian police and army. The Army was restructured according 
to NATO standards as part of the integration eff ort. This included the ra-
tionalization of equipment according to NATO effi  ciency standards. It also 
led to the professionalization of ARM in 2004. The years between 2002 and 
2007 saw the most active reforms in the area of defence, as provided by the 
National Strategy for NATO membership, and a number of other legal and 
strategic documents that were adopted in the security sector including the 
National Security Concept, the Defence Doctrine and amendments to the 
1991 Law on Defence as well as passing of other related legislation. The 
implementation of the reforms, while not perfect, advanced well and by 
the end of 2007, Macedonian progress with defence reforms, as well as the 
other political criteria for NATO membership, was positively evaluated and 
Macedonia was deemed ready for NATO membership. Reforming the po-
lice proved more diffi  cult than reforming the military, even though the EU 
contributed to police reforms through its police mission (EUPOL Proxima) 
13  On the eff ects of EU conditionality see:  G. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in EU Po-
litical Conditionality: Aims, Approach and Priorities” in Democratization. Vol. 14. No.3. (June 
2007), pp.446-471.  
14  “Balkan Monitor: Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans.” Gallup. 2008. http://
www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard/70-of-macedonian-albanians-supported-
ohrid-agreement/ 
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in Macedonia. EUPOL Proxima was meant to evaluate the need for reforms 
and assist the Macedonian government with expertise on police reforms, 
but many of the proposed reforms were politically sensitive and were stuck 
in the legislative or implementation process. The 2006 Police Law, as well as 
the new 2009 Police Law, was politically contentious and could barely get 
pass the Parliament. Decentralizing police competences and transferring 
police authorities to the local level was controversial in the post-confl ict 
context as trust in the police was still being rebuilt. 
Reforms in the public and security sectors were combined with introducing 
decentralization and gradual increase in the competencies of the local gov-
ernment in many areas, from education and urbanism to fi scal policy, but 
more importantly for this analysis, the local government was also granted 
some authority in the realm of police and public security. This marked the 
eff orts at bridging the gap between the police and the local communities, 
which were now meant to have a greater say in who is in charge and what 
the police is to do about their concerns.   
Much less attention was paid to reforming the other parts of the security 
sector (intelligence, private security companies etc.) as these years saw a 
surge in reforms in many areas so if an issue or area was not high on the 
EU and NATO agenda it would have likely been neglected and fallen down 
on the agenda. Macedonian politics in these years was markedly oriented 
towards integration in international organizations, mainly NATO and the 
EU. Macedonia joined NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999, and 
was a member of the Partnership for Peace since 1995. However, the real 
prospects for NATO membership opened after 2002 with the signing of the 
Adriatic Charter in 2003, when the Adriatic Three group – Albania, Croatia 
and Macedonia, was established and eff orts at fulfi lling the membership 
requirements intensifi ed. 
2.1.2. Reforms and integration efforts
At about the same time, EU integration eff orts also heightened, espe-
cially after the EC launched the Stabilization and Association process for 
the Western Balkans. Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement intended to bring the country closer to the EU mainstream in 
2001, applied for EU membership in 2004, and was awarded candidate sta-
tus in late 2005. After that, the accession process stalled since three consec-
utive Progress Reports of the EC failed to recommend start of the accession 
MACEDONIA: CONTEXT ANALYSIS PAPER
20
negotiations.15 While the delays are due to the government’s half-hearted 
eff orts at fulfi lling the requirements of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) and the eight benchmarks of 2008, they also tend to re-
tard the reform momentum and dilute the eff ects of conditionality. Since 
the 2006 elections and the new VMRO-DPMNE led cabinets the pace of EU- 
related reforms has slowed and no further progress towards accession has 
been made. 
In addition to eff orts towards EU and NATO integration, Macedonian poli-
tics of the post-Ohrid period has also been marked by the consequences 
of the 2001 confl ict and the challenges of post-confl ict society. One of the 
major problems and security threats of post-confl ict politics was handling 
extra-institutional armed groups from both sides.16 One of the fi rst meas-
ures at reconciliation and re-integration undertaken by the then-president 
Boris Trajkovski was to bestow amnesty upon all who took part in the con-
fl ict but did not commit crimes against humanity (in which case they would 
need to face either Macedonian or international courts). But amnesty did 
not provide a sustainable solution to the problem of integration of former 
combatants and the large amounts of small (and big) weapons freely cir-
culating among confl ict veterans and criminals. These presented potential 
threat to the security of Macedonian citizens and potential increase in crime 
rates. Confl ict veterans from the para-military units joined the police after 
short training courses. This did not add to the better quality of the services 
provided by the police or to the greater citizen trust in the police, which 
remained the same despite the ongoing reforms during these years.17 In 
the immediate post-confl ict period there were eff orts to collect the illegal 
weapons used during the confl ict through NATO missions Essential Harvest 
and Amber Fox, but neither was overly successful, as the number of col-
lected weapons was much smaller than their estimated number. NATO re-
mained present in Macedonia until 2003 when the Allied Harmony mission 
mandate was taken over by the EU. The EU mission was civilian and did not 
15  European Commission. Enlargement. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Key 
Documents. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/the_for-
mer_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/key_documents_en.htm  
16  Stevo Pendarovski, “Prilozi kon sistemot za nacionalna bezbednost” in Proces 2002: Bez-
bednosta na Republika Makedonija. Eds. S. Pendarovski, K. Nejkov and I. Yusufi  (Skopje: List, 
2002). pp.11-63. 
17  Trust in the police in 2003 was 61%, according to UNDP Early Warning Report, No.1, 2003. 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016469.pdf and 
with minor ups and downs remained about the same until 2008 when a total 58% of the 
population trusted the police, according to Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008. 
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concern collection of weapons, as that issue was deemed solved by previ-
ous NATO missions.  
Apart from the direct security threats stemming from the excess of avail-
able weapons and people willing to use them, the post-confl ict period also 
saw softer threats to security – mostly in the increasing social distance be-
tween the ethnic groups in Macedonia. The nature of the Ohrid Agreement 
was such that it allocated rights on collective grounds18, to groups rather 
than individuals, which shifted Macedonian democracy further away from 
liberal principles towards collective kind of consociational democracy19. 
The undeniable advantage of this trend was the increased access to politi-
cal power and participation to members of minority ethnic communities; 
however Macedonian politics was becoming increasingly ethnicized, as 
ever more issues on the political agenda were framed in ethnic terms and 
the double majority principle of decision-making (popularly known as the 
Badinter Principle) was very frequently used.20 This threatens to turn Mace-
donian politics into zero-sum game between the two largest ethnic groups, 
despite the fact that as a rule all Macedonian governments are coalitions 
between a Macedonian and an Albanian political party. The ethnicization of 
politics can lead to a nationalist backlash as political actors compete to win 
the electorate’s support and thus to potential back-rolling of democratic 
reforms and integrationist policies. Another by-product of the ethnic con-
fl ict was the emergence of confl ict veterans as a new actor in the security 
sector and in politics in general. Former members of National Liberation 
Army (NLA) and Macedonian para-militaries joined the police and created 
unions and associations, whose interests and demands were calculated in 
the complex equation of Macedonian domestic politics. 
18  For instance, the rights to use other languages than the Macedonian language as offi  cial 
are granted to ethnic communities who constitute more than 20% of the population in the 
given municipality. See Ohrid Framework Agreement: http://www.siofa.gov.mk/images/do-
kumente/Ramkoven%20dogovor.pdf  
19  The Ohrid Framework Agreement introduced power-sharing institutional mechanisms, 
such as proportional representation, equitable representation, double majority voting on 
certain issues in parliament, and extensive decentralization, which resemble the features of 
consociational democracies as described by Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: 
A Comparative Exploration. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and his later works 
on the same topic.
20  The Badinter principle requires double majority – an absolute majority plus a majority of 
the MPs from the non-majority ethnic groups, for adopting legislation in areas sensitive for 
ethnic relations, such as: education, culture, local government, personal documents, lan-
guages use etc. 
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To summarize, the general socio-political context in Macedonia between 
2001 and 2008 shows features of both post-confl ict and integration con-
texts. In other words, the measures to recover from the ethnic confl ict in 
2001 and return to peace-time politics were combined with eff orts aimed 
at integrating Macedonia in international organizations such as EU and 
NATO, a combination featuring increased reform activity in the public and 
security sectors. 
2.2. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis:
The confl ict in 2001, as brief as it was, revealed all the shortcomings and 
weak points of Macedonia’s security sector. In the fi rst instance, it showed 
that Macedonia had no functioning crisis management mechanism in 
place, as it was not instantly clear whose responsibility it is to respond to 
the threats. Indeed, the Crisis Management Centre was established in 2006, 
and before that nobody was responsible for information-gathering, early 
warning, and management of crises. The lack of integration between the 
diff erent security actors was also apparent, as cooperation between the po-
lice and the army, as well as the intelligence and military intelligence servic-
es was established only on the highest executive level, at the government 
and National Security Council meetings, while at operational and logistic 
level there was little cooperation. Moreover, armed units (army, police, re-
serves, except special units), lacked appropriate arms, equipment and skills 
to engage in combat and guerrilla warfare. Even though the government 
arranged quick procurements of weapons and equipment for the needs of 
the security forces, the military and police leadership displayed a lack of 
strategic knowledge and experience as most victims among the security 
forces were killed in ambush (8 policemen in Vejce in May 2001 and 10 sol-
diers in Karpalak in August 2001) due to insuffi  cient surveillance and sup-
port. Finally, large part of the ethnic Albanian policemen and soldiers left 
the security forces to join their fellow Albanians among the rebel troops 
thus showing a stronger loyalty to the ethnic group rather than the state. 
This pointed to a deeper societal problem of double loyalties among the 
members of the security forces, even if in terms of numbers this did not 
aff ect the manpower of Macedonian security forces since until 2001 there 
were very few ethnic Albanians there.  
The above long list of shortcomings of Macedonia’s security sector points 
to some of the directions in which security sector reform was conducted 
after the confl ict and how the security sector was restructured afterwards. 
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The confl ict also gave rise to new actors in the security sector, most promi-
nent of which are the para-military troops that fought on both sides, NLA 
and Lavovi, as well as the confl ict veterans, who later joined politics or exert 
pressure on political leaders. 
One of the major tasks after the end of confl ict was disarmament and de-
mobilization of troops as well as police and army reform in accordance to 
the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). The former was 
done with the assistance of NATO, as the more credible institution among 
the ethnic Albanian population in order to convince as many NLA members 
as possible to surrender their weapons. Despite such eff orts, NATO’s Essen-
tial Harvest mission collected less than the essential part of the weapons21, 
many of which remained in illegal possession among former fi ghters and 
made it to the criminal circles. The situation was similar with the weapons 
of Macedonian para-military troops, whom the police did not manage to 
fully disarm. The weapons collected after the confl ict, were destroyed. De-
mobilization was made easier by the amnesty that President Trajkovski pro-
claimed on all who had taken part in the confl ict, unless they have engaged 
in war crimes and crimes against humanity in which case they would be 
taken to court. 
As a solution for re-integration of former NLA and Lavovi members, many 
were quickly re-trained to join the police. In line with the OFA provisions, 
all public institutions needed to become more representative of the ‘non-
majority communities’ so more Albanians needed to be recruited by the 
police. The fi rst cohorts of Albanian policemen joined the police by the end 
of 2001, after a short training provided by US Department of Justice’s In-
ternational Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), in 
order to establish multi-ethnic police units to patrol the areas which the 
NLA controlled during the confl ict.22 Later, other international organiza-
tions joined to assist the Ministry of Interior in training the new police re-
cruits and pursuing other reforms in the police, namely OSCE and the EU, 
which dispatched the fi rst police mission Proxima to Macedonia in 2003. 
These reforms were aimed at a comprehensive makeover of the modus op-
erandi of Macedonian police including strengthening of regional coopera-
21  Essential Harvest Force collected 3,381 piece of weapons, which was evaluated by NATO 
as about two thirds of the total NLA arsenal. See Statement of Lord Robertson at the NATO 
Press Centre in Skopje held at September 25, 2001. Available at: http://www.nato.int/fyrom/
tfh/2001/t010925a.htm 
22  Thorsten Stodiek and Wolfgang Zellner, “The Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Services in the 
Western Balkans: A Record of Mixed Success,” Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 2007.
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tion, improving public trust, eff ective fi ght with crime and corruption etc. 
Overall, in the years that followed the 2001 confl ict substantial attention 
and resources, domestic and foreign, were committed to police reforms, 
which inevitably led to improved capacity, human and technical, of the po-
lice. In 2003, a new Police Academy was established to replace the Security 
Faculty, which was closed in 1999, as the place to train new policemen. In 
2004 the Border Police was established to replace ARM in patrolling the 
borders and the border belts and from 2005 onwards, as the relations with 
the EU intensifi ed, further eff orts at integrated border management, docu-
ment security and freedom of movement were implemented as part of the 
processes of visa facilitation and visa liberalization with the EU. The police 
was also aff ected with reforms in other areas in post-confl ict Macedonia, 
such as decentralization and public administration reform, so the 2006 Law 
on Police introduced new principles of work in the police, such as new hu-
man resources management practices of more transparent recruitment 
and evaluation, while signifi cant authority was given to the local govern-
ment in decisions related to local policing and local security including a say 
in the selection of local police chiefs.    
The reforms resulted with more intense relations between the police with 
other actors in the security sector and society. The police opened up for 
cooperation with international organizations and their expert teams who 
were responsible for evaluating the work and conducting trainings. Moreo-
ver, since police reform became a higher priority on the political agenda, it 
also attracted the attention of civil society and the academic community 
which approached the police more often in pursuit of information, ex-
pertise and assistance. With the creation of the Border Police a number of 
ARM members joined the ranks of the police and the relations between 
the two main pillars of Macedonia’s security sector were further aimed to 
be strengthened with the establishment of the Crisis Management Centre 
in 2006 a body that would better structure the response of state bodies in 
times of crisis and contribute to better integratedness of the entire security 
sector. Eff orts were made to increase the public trust in the police, espe-
cially among ethnic minorities with the establishment of the multi-ethnic 
police units, as well as among the wider population. The indicators of the 
period between 2001 and 2007 show no signifi cant increase in public trust 
in the police, rather Early Warning Reports suggest that public trust in the 
police was on the decline in these years.23 
23  UNDP Early Warning Report. 2004-2007. UNDP. Available at: www.ewr.org.mk 
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 The intelligence services were the least touched by the ongoing police re-
forms. Part of EU’s Proxima mission evaluated the work of these institutions 
and conducted trainings for operational and strategic improvement of their 
work, however, the government and the ministry did not follow the recom-
mendations with necessary regulation and legislation. No new legislation 
was adopted to address the work and status of the intelligence services or 
reform them following democratic principles of work. The Law on Internal 
Aff airs was not amended with new provisions for the intelligence services 
and neither was a separate law passed to regulate their work, so the intel-
ligence services remain governed by the 1995 law provisions. 
In this period, the work of private security agencies came to be regulated. 
With the 1999 Law on Protection of Persons and Property, the framework 
for their work is adopted and later amended in 2007 in order to further reg-
ulate the licensing, authority and training of these agencies and regulatory 
bodies are established (Chamber for protection of persons and property). 
Despite legal provisions preventing the work of policemen and former po-
licemen in private security agencies, these agencies foster close relations 
with the police facilitating the fl ow of information from the police to the 
private agencies. In addition, private security agencies are also linked to 
political parties, thanks to which affi  liation they strengthen their share of 
the security services market. Currently there are about 30 registered private 
security agencies in Macedonia.24 Their rise suggests the increasing link be-
tween security and the private sector, in general, of which private security 
agencies are just one instance. The public has often questioned the rights 
and obligations given to these agencies by the above-mentioned law.    
The period after 2001 also saw intensifi ed reforms in the military. Thanks 
to the rise of NATO integration as a top national priority, much attention 
and resources were devoted to improving the capacity of the military and 
adjusting the military sector to the international, mostly NATO, standards 
in this area. The government conducted a Strategic Defence Review in May 
2003, which led to the adoption of the new National Security Strategy (Na-
tional conception for security and defence) as well as the Policy Framework 
that same year. This legal framework aimed to reshape the military from 
territorial defence to deployability and sustainability. Joining the Member-
ship Action Plan after the Washington summit of NATO in 1999 Macedonia 
was allowed to benefi t from NATO programmes for assistance for mem-
bership and the government stared preparing Annual NATO Membership 
24  Katalog na agencii za obezbeduvanje. Komora za obezbeduvanje lica i imot na RM. Avail-
able at: http://www.obezbeduvanje.org.mk/KomoraContent.aspx?id=232 
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Programmes from 1999-2000 onward, to guide the reforms in the military 
sector. In the following years the size of the army was reduced, from 40,000 
in 1999 to 3,494 in 2007, and by 2006-7 the army was professionalized 
abolishing the concept of a conscript army, while obsolete weapons and 
equipment were replaced with NATO compatible technology.25 Re-training 
programmes were provided for the redundant offi  cers since 2005 with the 
support of foreign donors, to allow for faster re-integration of former mil-
itary personnel in civil life. The image of the army was further improved 
when Macedonian troops and units were sent on international missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and later to EU’s Althea mission in Bosnia, which im-
proved their interoperability and experience, strengthened relations with 
international partners and promoted an image of a professional and effi  -
cient army at home. 
Public trust in the army has always been higher than in the police, and in 
2008 about 70% of the population had some or a lot of trust in the army26, 
which is the second highest in the region after Kosovo. Admittedly, the army 
has the advantage of rarely engaging in contact with ordinary citizens, its 
work being focused mostly on international missions, and thus these per-
ceptions are based less on personal contact than on what is served by the 
media. However, the fact remains that the army has become one of the 
most trusted institutions in Macedonia. 
Post-2001 governments paid substantial attention to public sector reforms 
within the guidelines of the OFA, security sector included. Most of the stra-
tegic and legislative documents necessary for the implementation of re-
forms, as well as for progress with EU and NATO membership have been 
adopted without major problems within governing coalitions or in the 
Parliament. In addition to the existing laws and strategic documents, such 
as the White Book of Defence and Defence Strategy, in the post-2001 pe-
riod the government and parliament adopted Strategic Defence Review, 
National Concept for Security and Defence, while the Defence Strategy was 
missing. The only exception was the Law on Police, which was politically 
sensitive in the context of the decentralization process, but thanks to EU 
pressures was adopted in 2006, and introduced some of the necessary re-
forms in the work of the police.    
To summarize, the main features of the period between 2001 and 2008 are 
post-confl ict and integrationist. In the aftermath of the 2001 ethnic confl ict, 
25  Petar Skrbina, “Dolgiot Pat kon NATO” in Forum Analitika. Vol.1, (Nov-Dec 2006), pp.116-138.
26  Gallup Balkan Monitor. 2008.  
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Macedonia adopted many reform of the political system, the public sector 
and the security sector that were provided in the Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment but also those required for EU and NATO integration. With external 
support of NATO and EU further reforms of the army and the police have 
been implemented, and initial steps were taken to regulate the work of pri-
vate security companies. Intelligence services received the least attention 
in terms of reform.  
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PERIOD 3: 2008 – PRESENT: POST – 
VETO NATIONALISM 
It is a long road to walk from Ohrid to Bucharest, the diffi  culty of which be-
comes even more apparent when upon arrival one is faced with the closed 
gates of Bucharest. In April 2008 Bucharest hosted the NATO summit where 
the Adriatic Three (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) were expected to re-
ceive invitations to join the alliance. However, due to the unresolved dis-
pute about its name with Greece – a full member of NATO, Macedonia was 
not invited to join NATO. Membership was postponed until the name dis-
pute is solved. The Bucharest Summit veto was a watershed event in Mac-
edonian politics, one with multiple ramifi cations. 
First, the veto prevented Macedonia from joining NATO and further align-
ing its security sector development to the Euro-Altantic trends in this area. 
Having fulfi lled the membership requirements for joining NATO before the 
Bucharest Summit, Macedonia is not anymore subject to conditionality and 
therefore the incentive to continue with reforms of the security sector is 
decreased signifi cantly. Second, the veto threatened to discredit the en-
tire reform discourse based on the assumption that painful reforms need 
to be implemented and endured by the population because they will be 
rewarded with better living standards in future and country’s membership 
in international organizations. The veto in Bucharest proved the opposite. 
Governments could not rely anymore on the same argument when insist-
ing on pushing a demanding reform agenda. Some of the political elites 
immediately picked up on this rhetoric and government offi  cials and com-
mentators could be heard claiming that regardless of the progress made 
Macedonian further accession into EU will also be blocked by Greece. While 
this may be true, promoting such defeatist arguments only serves as an 
excuse for not doing much of reforms and fanning the wave of popular 
discontent. Third, Greek demands to change the constitutional name and 
the veto in Bucharest regretfully did not lead to a more constructive stand 
towards the name dispute but rather to the opposite. At present, an over-
whelming 95.8% of the ethnic Macedonian population would rather not 
join NATO and the EU if that would imply changing the name of the state.27 
Such attitudes may lead to a decreased support for EU and NATO integra-
tion and a shift in Macedonian foreign policy away from Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration.
27  Gallup Balkan Monitor. 2008.  
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Perhaps the most ominous consequence of the Bucharest veto is the na-
tionalist backlash in domestic politics. In a country which has a recent his-
tory of ethnic confl ict promoting nationalism can be very dangerous, as 
minority groups can feel excluded and threatened by the rising wave of 
nationalism among the majority population. In addition, the nationalist 
rhetoric among the elites in one group is bound to cause equally nationalist 
response in other ethnic groups, thus spurring a vicious circle of national-
ism and hatred. The recent turn to ancient history and quasi-scientifi c re-
discoveries of the ancient roots of the Macedonian nation is a move in this 
direction. Nationalist rhetoric is more attractive for the population than re-
form talk, so many of the necessary reforms in the public sector have been 
pushed into the background, as the government is focused on patriotic is-
sues. Patriotic rhetoric and issues relating to the ‘name dispute’ with Greece 
often push issues concerning security sector reform in the background. A 
recent draft Law on Internal Aff airs providing for an increased authority of 
the intelligence services, which followed a major increase in the budget of 
the intelligence service at the beginning of the year, saw very little public 
attention and debate about the implication of such law.
3.1. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis
In the brief period after 2008 there are few notable changes in the set up 
of the security sector in Macedonia, but which could set new trends in the 
security sector. One of the major events that brought the security sector to 
public attention was the increase in the budget of the intelligence service, 
especially UBK, in the 2009 budget, a controversial decision also from an 
economic point of view since 2009 budget was negotiated in the middle 
of world economic crisis, whose devastating consequences were also felt in 
Macedonia. Despite the crisis, the budget of UBK was increased to 25 mil-
lion euro, on top of what UBK was allocated in the budget of the Ministry 
for Interior, for which amount it is very diffi  cult to establish how it is spent, 
since the public, or even the Parliament have very limited authority over 
the spending of UBK. The eff ectiveness of parliamentary oversight over 
intelligence services will further be analyzed in a paper on parliamentary 
oversight over the security sector. This is not a unique instance since budg-
etary record in the past two years shows that military budget was cut twice 
in order to increase the budget of the Ministry of Interior.28 In addition to 
28  Natali Sotirovska and Igor Ilievski, “Kako rabotat makedonskite bezbednosni sluzbi”. Cen-
tre for Civil Communications. Available at: http://www.ccc.org.mk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=57%3A2009-05-04-12-29-09&catid=19%3Anatali-naskova-
sotirovska&Itemid=21&lang=mk 
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the budget cuts, the status of the army and professional soldiers has also 
been contentious. From late 2008 until mid 2009 the professional soldiers 
held peaceful protest against the draft law on army service, which limited 
their right to work in the army to 9 years and limits their opportunities and 
benefi ts after the termination of their service. Such imbalance between the 
funding of the military and the police, and especially the intelligence ser-
vices, points to an increase in police power in the state which runs counter 
to democratic principles of governance.
Another worrying trend is the limited democratic control and oversight of 
the intelligence services. In the course of the last almost fi fteen years the 
work of the UBK was regulated by the 1995 Law on Internal Aff airs which 
contains several broad articles providing general guidelines on the na-
ture of its work and parliamentary oversight over it. The law left substan-
tial margins of discretion to the Director of UBK and the government to 
decide on the work and structure of this body. In addition, parliamentary 
control, while never too strong, had gotten increasingly weak as in the last 
two years the parliamentary committee for control of the work of the intelli-
gence services has been under-functional since the intelligence leadership 
has paid no heed to the call for greater accountability in front of the public 
and UBK Director never appeared in front of the Parliament. Some concerns 
are raised about the members of the parliamentary committee overseeing 
the work of the intelligence service, as committee vice-president Rexhep 
Dauti – Leka and committee member Hisen Xhemaili are under investiga-
tion for war crimes during the 2001 confl ict, Xhemaili avoiding the police 
and courts for the last several years. 
Overall the political and security context in Macedonia in the last couple 
of years raises some concerns about the irreversible nature of democratic 
consolidation and security reform. The halt in NATO and EU integration has 
opened the door for nationalist politics and the decreased international 
pressure has led to neglect of reforms and democratic principles of work, 
potentially endangering the entire security sector reform process in Mac-
edonia. 
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Conclusions
This paper examined the general political context of post-communist 
Macedonia with particular emphasis on the security sector context. The 
paper looked in general at the political trends and developments in Mace-
donia since 1991, zooming in on those aspects of the political context that 
bear special relevance to security sector reforms. The analysis was divided 
on three periods: the fi rst from 1991 to 2001, the second from 2001 to 2008 
and the third after 2008. Each of these periods is distinct for the dominant 
issues and challenges diff er throughout the years, and so does the domi-
nant nature of the political context.
The initial decade after independence saw the establishment of indepen-
dent Macedonian state, as well as the reform and creation of the crucial 
security institutions such as the army and the police, including the intel-
ligence services. The insecure regional environment combined with weak 
domestic institutions and spoiled inter-ethnic relation produce an unstable 
security environment resulting with a pronounced post-authoritarian and 
pre-confl ict nature of the political context. 
The second period is post-confl ict as the greatest attention is paid to chal-
lenges posed by the post-confl ict political and security environment. This 
demanding environment is complemented by increased eff ort at integra-
tion in international organizations, mainly NATO and the EU, thus doubling 
the eff orts of domestic political and security actors to pursue required re-
forms. This period testifi es to the successful combination of post-confl ict 
with integrationist political context. It shows the complementary nature 
of reforms required for overcoming confl ict legacies and those for gaining 
membership in international organizations.
The fi nal period after 2008 points to the rise of nationalism and shifts to-
wards more closed politics in Macedonia after the Greek veto at the NATO 
summit in 2008. The veto caused a slowdown in security related reforms, 
as well as in many other policy areas and retarded the pace of reforms re-
quired for EU integration as well. This period, whose dominant context can 
be labelled nationalist, shows that the upward trajectory of post-commu-
nist transition cannot be taken for granted. The Macedonian case shows 
how NATO and EU membership are not always or necessarily the next step 
after post-communist transition and post-confl ict reconstruction marking 
the end of the transition journey. This is a unique feature of Macedonian 
politics among the other states in the Western Balkans region, placing the 
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entire question of political and security sector reforms in a more open de-
velopment-democratization framework .        
To summarize, since independence Macedonia has undergone three peri-
ods of political and security transformation. The initial one, between 1991 
and 2001, can be categorized as predominantly post-authoritarian. It saw 
limited reforms in the security sector as issues concerning independent 
statehood and international recognition were of higher priority on the gov-
ernments’ agendas. During the fi rst period, inter-ethnic relations in Mace-
donia deteriorated and led to the ethnic confl ict in 2001. The second period 
between 2001 and 2008, covers the time from the ethnic confl ict in 2001 
until the 2008 NATO summit when Macedonia was expected to receive in-
vitation for NATO membership. The main features of this period are post-
confl ict and integrationist, as a number of important reforms in the security 
sector: police, army, intelligence, PSC were introduced during this period in 
order to re-build inter-ethnic trust as well as fulfi l the membership require-
ments for NATO and EU. The fi nal period, from 2008, marks the decline of 
security sector reforms and intensifi ed nationalist rhetoric, as a result of the 
problems faced in gaining NATO membership and opening EU accession 
negotiations because of the name dispute with Greece. 
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Opening note on the Chronology
This document is a product of project “Mapping and Monitoring of Security 
Sector Reform in the Western Balkans”, and contains a chronology of the 
most important events related to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Macedo-
nia from 1991 to 2009. These are the events which outlined the context of 
SSR in Macedonia.
1991
- Kiro Gligorov was elected as the fi rst President of independent Mac-
edonia by the Assembly. This mode of election was done according 
to the existing rules from the previous regime.  
- Macedonia held its referendum on independence on 8 September. 
The choice was for the citizens to claim whether they were in favor 
of Macedonia as a sovereign independent state, with the right to 
enter a future federation with the other Yugoslav republics.29 On the 
grounds of the results from this referendum, the Assembly adopted 
the Declaration for International Recognition of the Republic of 
Macedonia, demanding for international recognition.30
29  Political structure. Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. <http://www.mfa.gov.
mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=289>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
30 History. Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/de-
fault1.aspx?ItemID=289>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
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- The fi rst government of the independent Republic of Macedonia 
was formed, headed by Nikola Kljusev. This was a provisional gov-
ernment, created to govern in the period before the new Parliament 
(formed after the November 1990 elections) created the new post-
federal government. The winning party, however, VMRO-DPMNE 
could not rally enough support in Parliament for its cabinet, since it 
refused to enter into a coalition with other parties.
- The new constitution of Republic of Macedonia was adopted by the 
Assembly on 17 November.31 This was the fi rst constitution of inde-
pendent Macedonia, and is still in force.
1992
- Macedonia’s Constitution was evaluated in January 1992 by the 
Badinter Arbitration Commission as a democratic one and fulfi lling 
conditions necessary for international recognition.32
- President Gligorov and representatives of the Yugoslav Peoples 
Army (JNA) sign an agreement whereby the JNA was to withdraw 
from Macedonia until 15 April. In the course of the withdrawal of 
the JNA, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia was created.
- The Macedonian National Guard was created by the VMRO-DMPNE 
(then opposition),  ostensibly in order to protect Macedonia in case 
of clashes with the JNA.33
- A referendum (deemed invalid because it did not follow the legal 
referendum procedure) was held by the Albanians for independ-
ence from Macedonia, which was later on followed by a proclama-
tion of a “Republic of Illirida”.
31 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Offi  cial Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia. 
<http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/WBStorage/Files/USTAV-eng.pdf>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.




33 Vankovska, Biljana. Security Sector Reform in Macedonia. In Trapans, Jan and Phillipp H. 
Fluri (eds). Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: In-
sights and Perspectives, Volume II - Macedonia, Moldova, Romania. Geneva, Belgrade: DCAF, 
CCMR, 2003: 28.
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- The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje, the longest-running 
fi eld mission of the OSCE, was established in Skopje. In the long 
years of its running in Macedonia, it has been an initiator, provider 
of fi nances, as well as expertise for many SSR projects in Macedo-
nia.34
- The fi rst organic law of the Republic of Macedonia, the Law on De-
fense, was adopted in the Parliament in February. This law left many 
points unclear with regard to the rights, obligations, and authorisa-
tions of the defense sector. This is why it needed to be replaced 
with a new law in 2001.
- The UN (on a call from the President of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov, as 
well as with the diplomatic eff orts of co-chair of the International 
Conference for Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen) 
started its UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia. The UNPROFOR had 
a task to prevent a spillover of the confl ict in Macedonia.35 UNPRO-
FOR patrolled the new borders of Macedonia along with members 
of the Territorial Defense until the Macedonian Army built the ca-
pacity to take over this task. 
1993
- Resolution 817 was adopted by the UN Security Council, recom-
mending to the General Assembly that Macedonia is admitted as 
a member into the UN, under a provisional reference (Former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia) on the 7th of April36, and a decision 
on admission by the General Assembly was adopted on the 8th of 
April.37
34  OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje. OSCE. <http://www.osce.org/skopje/>. Accessed 
on 15 December 2008.
35 UNPROFOR. UN Website. < http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.
htm>. Accessed on 03 December 2008.
36 Resolution 817. UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,,MKD,3b0
0f15623,0.html>.
37  Admission of the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 
to membership in the United Nation. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
res/47/a47r225.htm>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.s
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- Resolution demonstrating Macedonia’s willingness to join NATO 
was adopted by the Macedonian Assembly in December 1993.38
1994
- The second Parliamentary elections were held. Left-of-centre Social 
Democratic Union (SDSM) won another mandate on these elec-
tions, and Branko Crvenkovski formed the government, with Alba-
nian coalition-partner PDP, a political combination which was to 
lead the country until 1998.
- The second Presidential elections were held, in parallel with the 
Parliamentary ones. The then President, Kiro Gligorov, was re-elect-
ed for another mandate, and served in offi  ce until 1999.
1995
- The Law on Internal Aff airs was adopted, regulating the work of the 
Ministry of Interior. The 1995 Law instituted the principle of Par-
liamentary oversight over the work of the intelligence services. A 
Parliamentary Commission would oversee the work of the secret 
services (Directorate for Security and Counter-intelligence) and 
report annually to Parliament about it. The work of the police was 
also regulated under this law until 2007, when a new law on police 
entered into force.
- A Law on the Intelligence Agency was adopted. The Agency was 
instituted as a separate body under direct Presidential and Parlia-
mentary oversight, thus separating the intelligence and counter-
intelligence services, which until then were under the single au-
thority of State Security. The Intelligence Agency Director is to be 
appointed by the President, not the Government (Interior Ministry), 
and reports directly to the President. However, the agency started 
to work in 1997 when its Chief of Staff  was elected.
- At the opening ceremony of the then-illegal Tetovo University (later 
38 Macedonia and NATO Chronology. Ministery of Foreign Aff airs. http://www.mfa.gov.mk/de-
fault1.aspx?ItemID=313>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
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recognized as State University of Tetovo), the police intervened and 
violently dispersed those present. At that time, the education in 
Albanian language in Macedonia was not provided in the tertiary 
education. The incident was one of the sparks and driving forces for 
the unrests in the western parts of Macedonia.
- The interim accord on the name dispute with Greece was signed on 
September 13, granting Macedonia the right to join international 
organizations (including the UN) under the provisional name For-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and calling upon 
both sides, Macedonia and Greece to fi nd a commonly-accepted 
solution on the name dispute.
- The UNPROFOR mission was replaced with the UNPREDEP mission. 
This was the fi rst preventive deployment mission in the history of 
the UN.39
- Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace. A frame agreement for 
acceding to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was reached in Novem-
ber 1995, among Macedonia and NATO.40 
- An assassination attempt on President Gligorov with a car bomb 
happened in October. The perpetrators of this act are still unknown.
- Military academy is established. 
1996
- The SOFA Agreement between NATO and Macedonia was signed, 
giving the NATO forces a lot of competencies for using Macedonian 
territory for its activities.41
- In July, Macedonia opened a liaison offi  ce at NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels.  
39 UNPERDEP. UN Website. <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpredep.htm>. Ac-
cessed on 03 December 2008.
40  Macedonia and NATO Chronology. Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. http://www.mfa.gov.mk/de-
fault1.aspx?ItemID=313>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
41  Macedonia and NATO Chronology. Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. http://www.mfa.gov.mk/de-
fault1.aspx?ItemID=313>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
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1997
- The intelligence agency which was founded with the 1995 law fi -
nally started its work eff ectively, since its fi rst director was fi nally 
appointed.42
- In July, the police clashed with civilians in Gostivar and Tetovo over 
the removal of Albanian and Turkish fl ags displayed in front of 
Town Halls, deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
One person died and several were injured and Gostivar’s mayor Rufi  
Osmani was tried and sentenced to prison. This further exacerbated 
inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. 
- First international military exercise held in Macedonia - “Savior 97”, 
took place at military grounds near Negotino. 
1998
- The third Parliamentary elections were held, with a change in the 
winning parties.  VMRO-DPMNE won the elections, with its Alba-
nian counterpart the DPA as its coalition partner. SDSM’s coalition 
came in second and was for the fi rst time in the opposition.43
- Macedonia hosted air force and military troops’ exercises in which 
NATO and PfP members participated. Macedonian special army 
units took place in the exercise.  
- White Paper on Defence adopted in August.
42 Vankovska, Biljana. Security Sector Reform in Macedonia. In Trapans, Jan and Phillipp H. Fluri 
(eds). Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and 
Perspectives, Volume II - Macedonia, Moldova, Romania. Geneva, Belgrade: DCAF, CCMR, 2003: 
27.
43  Elections 1998. Elections website. <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/parlamentarni%2098/index.
html>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
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1999
- Due to China’s veto in February, the UNPREDEP mandate in Mac-
edonia was terminated.44
- About 40,000 NATO troops were positioned on Macedonian terri-
tory during the 1999 Kosovo crisis (this is four times the number of 
the ARM).
- Macedonia offi  cially became a candidate for NATO membership.45
- The third Presidential elections were held. Boris Trajkovski, nomi-
nated by the then leading party VMRO – DPMNE, won the elec-
tions and became the new President of Macedonia for the next fi ve 
years.46
- Defence Strategy adopted in September.
2000
- Macedonia, together with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Croatia joined later), cre-
ated the Vilnius Group.47
- Between 10,000-15,000 police fi les dating to the early years of com-
munism were opened for public access. This was the fi rst eff ort at 
disclosing information about the communist past and step towards 
reconciliation with the SFRJ era. 
- Action Plan for National Defence adopted
44 UNPERDEP. UN Website. <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpredep.htm>. Ac-
cessed on 03 December 2008.
45  Macedonia and NATO Chronology. Ministery of Foreign Aff airs. http://www.mfa.gov.mk/
default1.aspx?ItemID=313>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
46 Elections 1998. Elections website. <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/pretsedatelski%2099/Default.
htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
47 Macedonia and NATO Chronology. Ministery of Foreign Aff airs. http://www.mfa.gov.mk/de-
fault1.aspx?ItemID=313>. Accessed on 25 October 2008.
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2001
- The phone-tapping aff air was exposed by Branko Crvenkovski 
(then, opposition leader) in January.48 It stirred debates about regu-
lation of state control of communication, but a law on the matter 
would not be adopted until 2006. 
- A TV news team was held hostage in the Skopje village of Tanush-
evci, in February, after it wanted to visit the village and check the 
rumors that an armed group was patrolling the village. Snezana Lu-
pevska was the fi rst to expose the coming confl ict. It was beginning 
of the confl ict that was to last until August.
- The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed in Brussels 
on the 9 April. Macedonia was the fi rst country ever to sign this kind 
of an agreement. The SAA is today known as a tool applied to the 
Western Balkans.49
- Due to the situation in Macedonia, the opposition called for the cre-
ation of a government of national unity. This demand was backed 
up by the international community, and such a government was 
created on May 13.
- During the confl ict, Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski saw the estab-
lishment of special police units called Lavovi recruited from volun-
teers and reserve police force members, who fought in the confl ict. 
- On 13 August, the Ohrid Framework agreement was signed, for-
mally ending the 2001 confl ict in Macedonia. This agreement was 
signed by the leaders of the four biggest political parties: Ljubcho 
Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), Imer Im-
eri (PDP) and Arben Xhaferi (DPA), by the President of the country 
and by the representatives of the EU and of the US.
- The fi rst of the NATO mission series started in August. It was the 
“Essential Harvest” mission, with the aim of collecting the weapons 
48 Crvenkovski and Xaferi have been phone-tapped. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.mk/
vesti/default.aspx?VestID=2215>. Accessed on 15 December 2008.
49 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
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from the NLA fi ghters.50 The “Amber Fox” mission starting in the end 
of September 2001 replaced “Essential Harvest”.51
- The constitutional amendments envisaged in the OFA were adopt-
ed. They were the grounds for all the laws through which the Ohrid 
process was conducted.52 Among other things, equitable represen-
tation of all ethnic groups in the police and army was envisaged. 
2002
- Allied Harmony, the fi nal in the series of NATO missions, ran from 
December 2002 to March 2003.53 It was replaced by Concordia, the 
fi rst EU military mission ever.
- In March 2003, the Concordia mission of the EU started. It ran until 
December 2003.54
- A donor conference for Macedonia was held in March 2002, where 
Macedonia acquired 307 Million Euros from the donors.55 However, 
these funds were conditional and some in forms of credits.
- A Law on Amnesty was adopted. This law granted amnesty to all 
those who had committed crimes in the period between 1 January 
2001 and 26 September 2001.56
- A new set of Parliamentary elections were held. SDSM won a man-
50 NATO Issues: Operation Essential Harvest. NATO Website. <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/
home.htm>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
51 NATO Issues: Operation Amber Fox. NATO Website. < http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff /home.
htm>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
52 Constitutional Amendmens. Pravo org. <http://www.pravo.org.mk/download.
asp?ID=2&sID=326>. Accessed on 6 November 2008. 
53 Allied Harmony. NATO HQ. <http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/alliedHarmony/alliedHar-
mony%20Mission.htm>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
54 Concordia. Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/
showPage.asp?id=594&lang=EN>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
55 Maceodnia acquired 307 million from the donor conference. A1 Television. <http://www.
a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=6818>. Accessed on 25 December 2008.
56 Law on amnesty. Pravo. <http://www.pravo.org.mk/download.asp?ID=1&zID=22>. Ac-
cessed on 24 October 2008.
MACEDONIA: CONTEXT ANALYSIS PAPER
50
date to govern until 2006. Branko Crvenkovski was given the man-
date to create the government.57
- Lavovi unit of police disbanded in November. 
- Strategic Defence Review (Political Framework) adopted in October 
and the National Conception of Security and Defence, adopted in 
June.
- Dynamic Plan for Transformation of the ARM adopted by Parlia-
ment in May.
2003
- Grenades by unknown sources hit government buildings in Skopje. 
The government claimed it was a terrorist attack. 58
- A voluntary disarmament program commenced in 1 November and 
was supposed to last for six weeks, ending on 15th of December.59
- The EU peacekeeping mission Concordia ended on 15th of De-
cember, and was replaced by the EU police mission PROXIMA.60 
PROXIMA’s role was later in December 2005 taken over by EUPAT, a 
smaller police advisory team.61
- The Interior Ministry dissolved the special police unit Lavovi formed 
during the 2001 confl ict. Half its members were incorporated in the 
regular police. 
- Macedonian Parliament adopted the National Concept for Security 
and Defense, the major strategic document in the security sector 
57 Elections 2002. Elections website. <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/par2002/kon_rezultati/RE-
ZULTATI.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
58 Grendades Macedonian Government. SETTimes. <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/se-
times/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2007/08/07/nb-02>. Accessed on 30 No-
vember 2008.
59  Disarmament to start today with a media campaign. Dnevnik. <http://star.dnevnik.com.
mk/default.aspx?pbroj=2219&stID=21440&pdate=20030806>. Accessed on 23 October 2008.
60 Proxima. Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/show-
Page.asp?id=584&lang=EN&mode=g>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
61 EUPAT. Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/show-
Page.asp?id=994&lang=EN&mode=g>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
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– defi ning threats, strategic interests, and values in Macedonian se-
curity. 
- Military Academy is abolished.
2004
- President Boris Trajkovski died in a plane crash in Bosnia on 27 Feb-
ruary. Speaker Ljubcho Jordanovski was acting president until the 
April 2004 Presidential Elections. The new Presidential elections 
were scheduled for 14 April 2004.
- Macedonia offi  cially applied for EU membership on 22 March.62
- The Stabilisation and Association Agreement, signed between the 
European Union and Macedonia in 2001, came in eff ect on 1 April 
2004.63
- First round of presidential elections was held, leaving Branko Crven-
kovski from SDSM and Sashko Kedev from VMRO-DPMNE, to run for 
President in the second round. Second round of Presidential elec-
tions was held, whereby Branko Crvenkovski won the elections.64
- The Law on Territorial reorganisation of municipal boundaries, en-
visaged in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was voted in 
the parliament with 61 votes for (Macedonian parliament held 120 
seats) on 11 August. This Law was a crucial for both Macedonia’s 
EU membership bid and (even more) for the implementation of 
the OFA. A referendum regarding decentralisation was scheduled 
for later in 2004 (November) after the World Macedonian Congress 
gathered more than 150,000 signatures to force this referendum.65
62 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
63 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
64 Elections 2004. Elections website. <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/pretsedatelski2004/>. Ac-
cessed on 24 October 2008.
65 Gathered over 90000 signatures for referendum. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.mk/
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- A referendum was held on 7 November to determine the citizens’ 
preferences over decentralisation models, that is whether they 
preferred the model according to the old decentralisation law 
or according to the new one. The referendum failed because of 
a low turnout (26% out of 50% minimum needed in order to be 
successful).66
- Hari Kostov resigned from being Prime Minister, claiming unbridge-
able diff erences in the economic policy as well as other reasons. 
Vlado Buckovski, former Minister of Defence at the time of the crisis 
as well as in the government of the resigning Hari Kostov, was given 
the mandate to create the new government, which came in offi  ce 
in December.67
- The Border Police took over the patrolling and control of Macedo-
nian borders from the Macedonian Army. 
- Interior Ministry created special mobile police units intended to 
fi ght urban crime. The units (popularly known as ‘Alpha Units’) have 
been regularly criticised by the civil sector for their lack of respect 
for human rights.
2005
- Answers to the Questionnaire posted to Macedonia by the EU were 
presented in Brussels by the then Prime Minister Buckovski.68
- Local elections were held in March. The fi rst Round of elections for 
the municipalities, fi lled with irregularities as the OSCE observers 
missions reported. The second round was boycotted by the DPA 
and the PDP.
vesti/default.aspx?VestID=35136>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
66 Referendum. Elections website. <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/referendum2004/>. Accessed 
on 24 October 2008.
67 Army and police veterans claim corruption. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/
default.aspx?VestID=44156>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
68 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
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- Macedonia, having pledged cooperation with the ICTY in The 
Hague, extradited ex-Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski to The 
Hague in March, after running away from Macedonia and being ar-
rested and held in custody by the Croatian police. Johan Tarculov-
ski, member of a special unit of the Macedonian police force joins 
Boskovski in the Hague.69
- The Law on Flags was adopted, thus making the technical fulfi ll-
ment of OFA complete. This law was highly contested during the 
long debates which started in June 2005.
- The Prime Minister Buckovski survived a vote of no confi dence in 
September.
- The European Commission recommended, on 9 November, that 
Macedonia should be granted a candidacy status for entering the 
EU.70
- A Brussels summit of December did confi rm the candidate status 
but did not set a date for start of negotiations.71
- EU established EU Policy Advisory Team (EUPAT) to replace the po-
lice mission PROXIMA.72
- Defense Ministry established a Unit for Return to Civil Life, aimed at 
preparing military personnel for return to civil life after the end of 
their military career. Members of the military are re-trained for skills 
deemed useful for the transition to civil life. 
69 Hague fi led charges against Boskovski and Tarculovski. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.
mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=44109>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
70 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
71 European Commission, Enlargement. European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu_the_former_yugo-
slav_republic_of_macedonia_relations_en.htm>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
72 EUPAT. Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/show-
Page.asp?id=994&lang=EN&mode=g>. Accessed on 13 November 2008.
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2006
- The Parliament approved in May the abolition of mandatory con-
scription in the army, and the commencement of the profession-
alisation of the army, which was one of the conditions for NATO 
membership.
- After a series of hostilities and manifestations of violence between 
the two leading Albanian parties (DPA and DUI), a joint statement 
on continuing the elections without violence followed (in June 
2006), under the patronage of the EU representative in Macedonia 
– Erwan Fouere and the USA Ambassador in the state – Gillian Mi-
lovanovic.73
- The Parliamentary elections were held on 5 July, with a switch in the 
governing structure. VMRO-DPMNE won 44 (out of 120) seats in the 
parliament, thus winning the elections. A second round was held 
in some places, and the voting was annulled in one place because 
of excessive violence and vandalism of the ballot boxes. VMRO-
DPMNE won more seats at the second round, and Nikola Gruevski, 
the party’s president, was given the mandate to form the govern-
ment. The Albanian party with a majority of votes was DUI. The new 
Parliament approved the government under Prime Minister Nikola 
Gruevski in August, consisted of VMRO-DPMNE as the leading party 
and other smaller parties as coalition partners. DUI continued to 
oppose its non-inclusion in the government since it won majority 
of Albanian votes.74
- The public prosecutor Prcevski was removed on grounds of unpro-
fessionalism and ineffi  ciency in October.75
- The police reform furthered in November with the Parliament’s 
passing of the Law on Police. The Law on Police provided for sub-
stantial decentralisation of police service and transferred authori-
ties related to appointment of police heads to local government 
units. This was done without the support of DUI and PDP, who 
73 End to pre-election violence. A1 Television. < http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.
aspx?VestID=64488>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
74 Elections recognizable because of personal battles. A1 Television. < A1 Television. <http://
www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=35136>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
75 The Assembly discharged Prchevski. A1 Television. < http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.
aspx?VestID=68866>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
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warned their mayors would not cooperate with police.76 
- Vlado Buckovski resigned as the leader of SDSM after a no-confi -
dence vote, and was replaced later on by Radmila Shekerinska in 
December.
- The judicial reforms also furthered, since 8 new members of the 
judicial council were elected. This went in favor of enhancing the 
impartiality of the Council since it will no longer be elected by the 
Parliament but by the judges themselves.
2007
- The Macedonian government renamed the Skopje Airport after Al-
exander the Great, which was seen by Greece as a violation of the 
interim agreement.77
- In March, Gruevski met with the leader of the Albanian opposition 
and a former NLA leader, Ali Ahmeti agreeing to start over with the 
(until then) blocked political dialogue, as well as to have a meet-
ing on which a list of laws which aff ect minorities and should be 
adopted with the so called Badinter majority, will be adopted.
- Another Albanian party joined the governing coalition on 20 May - 
the PDP. After this, DUI ended the long Parliamentary boycott and 
fi nally entered Parliament.
- The opposition proposed a no-confi dence motion in June, which 
was rejected by the Parliament. This was followed by a short leave 
from the Parliament claiming altering of pre-agreed terms by DUI. 
However, they returned in offi  ce and together with the other par-
ties, they all agreed on prosecution offi  ce reforms.
- National Security Council met to discuss potential security threats 
to derive from Kosovo in August. Shortly before these, another gre-
nade attack on government facilities occurred.
76 Law on Police passed. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.
aspx?VestID=69550>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
77  Bakoyanniss calls for a new round of name talks. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.mk/
vesti/default.aspx?VestID=72583>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
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- A Parliamentary debate between DPA and DUI resulted in a fi st-
fi ght between members of the two parties in the hall of Parliament 
and subsequent need of police intervention.
- Two Constitutional Court judges (one of which was the court’s Pres-
ident) resigned because of a decision of the court to restrict the use 
and display of Albanian fl ags on public buildings.78
- The police engaged in operation “Mountain Storm” on November 7 
near the village of Brodec against a group of ethnic-Albanian crimi-
nals in which 8 gunmen were shot dead, and large quantities of 
weapons were found.79 Despite initial congratulations on the eff ec-
tive operation of the multi-ethnic police units, the conduct of the 
police in this operation has become the subject of criticism from 
Albanian political subjects and contentious point in inter-ethnic re-
lations in Macedonia.
2008
- Parliamentary opposition (SDSM and DUI) demanded resignation 
from Gordana Jankulovska, Minister of Interior, because of the “Bro-
dec” operation.
- DPA returned to the governing coalition after a few days crisis be-
cause of its leave over minority rights disagreements.80
- Greece vetoed Macedonia’s bid for NATO membership at the Bu-
charest NATO summit in April. Macedonia was left out from the 
progress of the so called Adriatic Charter, since both Croatia and 
Albania did receive invitations to join NATO. 81
78 Trendafi l Ivanovski – new president of the constitutional court. A1 Television. < http://www.
a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=85646>. Accessed on 27 October 2008.
79 Six people dead and 13 arrested in the Brodec Action. A1 Television. <http://www.a1.com.
mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=85852>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
80 DPA returns to Macedonian government. SetTimes. <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/se-
times/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/03/24/nb-01>. Accessed on 24 Octo-
ber 2008.
81 Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008. NATO Summit Bu-
charest 2008. <http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html>. Accessed on 28 October 
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- In May, Macedonia and the US signed a Declaration for Strategic 
Partnership and Cooperation aimed at furthering US-Macedonian 
relation in the areas of security, economy and trade. 
- On DUI’s initiative,82 the Parliament dissolved and called for early 
elections on 1 June.83
- VMRO-DPMNE coalition won 63 (out of 120) parliamentary seats in 
the 2008 Parliamentary elections held on 1 June. Reruns in some 
areas were held on the 15 June. New government of the Prime Min-
ister Gruevski was elected in July 26, incorporating the Albanian 
political party which won most seats at the 2008 elections – DUI. 
Elections were full of irregularities in the fi rst round, and had some 
small improvements during the second one. Implementation of the 
OSCE–ODIHR mission’s recommendations84, which was monitoring 
the elections became the ninth benchmark for Macedonia on its 
road to getting a date for start of accession talks.
- DPA announced a boycott of Parliament  on 11 July; opposition So-
cial Democrats joined this walkout on 17 July after arrest of party 
VP Zoran Zaev, charged with abuse of authority as Strumica mayor. 
President Crvenkovski called for an end to the boycott on 31 July, 
and said he would pardon Zaev.
- Ljube Boskovski was freed from the ICTY on 10 July in his trial for 
command responsibility. Tarculovski was sentenced to 12 years, 
and his case undergoes an appeal.85
2008.
82 DUI calls for early parliamentary elections. SetTimes. < http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/
setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/04/08/nb-02>. Accessed on 24 Oc-
tober 2008.
83 Macedonian parliament dissolves, early elections set for June. SetTimes. <http://www.se-
times.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/04/13/nb-01>. 
Accessed on 24 October 2008.
84 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje. OSCE. <http://www.osce.org/skopje/>. Accessed 
on 03 December 2008.
85 The Hague acquits Macedonia’s Boskovski, convicts Tarculovski. SetTImes. <http://www.
setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/07/14/fea-
ture-02>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
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- SDSM elected Zoran Zaev in September 2008, after Sekerinska 
resignation, as an interim leader until the mandate of the current 
president Branko Crvenkovski expires.86
- Macedonia fi lled a case against Greece in front of the ICJ on the 
17 November on the  grounds of having broken the interim accord 
from 1995 by blocking Macedonia’s NATO membership bid thus 
causing for an invitation not to be extended to Macedonia.87 The 
Macedonia–Greece name dispute, the key for Macedonia’s mem-
bership in NATO, will continue on the scene at the ICJ.
2009
- Ministry of Defense adopted the Programme for Equal Opportuni-
ties for Men and Women as part of its Human Resources Strategy 
and in accordance with the 2006 Law on Equal Opportunities for 
Men and Women. The objective is gender mainstreaming in the 
work of the Ministry and removing obstacles to equal opportuni-
ties and equal treatment of men and women. 
- The Interior Ministry drafted amendments to the Law on Internal 
Aff airs aimed at instituting a career-based civil service system in 
the Ministry to improve the effi  ciency and professionalisation of 
the police.  
- Presidential and municipal elections were held in March/April. 
Gjorgje Ivanov became the new President of the country. 
- Military academy is re-established. 
86 SDSM Elects New President. SetTimes. <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/
en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/09/25/feature-02>. Accessed on 24 October 2008.
87 Proceedings instituted by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia against Greece: Pend-
ing Cases. International Court of Justice. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/142/14881.pdf>. 
Accessed on 13 November 2008.
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